Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention
on Territorial Asylum

RICHARD PLENDER*

The definition of the word refugee in the 1951 Convention
and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees extends to no
more than half of the world's displaced people. Although the
remainderare often eligible for the protection afforded by the
High Commissioner's good offices, their exclusion from that
definition remains a matter of concern. A proposed new Convention on TerritorialAsylum, the subject of a recent Geneva
Conference designed to overcome some of the shortcomings of
the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol,is itself open to objections. This Article discusses the limitations of the term refugee and recommends that the emphasis of the new Convention be altered so as to deal more effectively with fugitives
who presently do not qualify as refugees.
INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the second World War the number of refugees in
the world has not fallen below 5,000,000.' Of these, about 2,300,000
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1. The minimum figure of 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 was given by Frank Kellogg,
United States Undersecretary of State for Migration Affairs, in an unpublished
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are "of concern" to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).2 This figure of 2,300,000 embraces
those who are eligible to receive the High Commissioner's protection, whether or not they have been granted asylum in the territory of a State which is a party to either of the two principal international instruments governing the admission of refugees to countries
of asylum-the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
and its Protocol of 1967.1 If these figures are fairly accurate, it may
extends to no
be inferred that the High Commissioner's competence
4
more than about half of the world's refugees.
Indeed, even this calculation may overstate the proportion of the
world's refugees who fall within the competence of the United Nations High Commissioner. It does not take into account the fact that
only sixty-nine states, representing about one quarter of the world's
population, have ratified either the 1951 Convention or the 1967
Protocol. 5 Moreover this calculation fails to take into account international crises which may swell the ranks of those refugees outside of
the High Commissioner's mandate to numbers in excess of
5,000,000-crises such as we have seen in recent years in Cyprus, the
Lebanon, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).
speech at Cambridge University (1975). The estimate is compatible with that of
A. BOUSCAREN, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS SINCE 1945 at 21 (1963).

2. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ISN'T HOPELESS UNLESS You THINK SO 9 (1975).

3. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, July 28, 1951, is based (with certain amendments) on G.A. Res. 429, 5 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 48, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The Protocol Relating to the

Status of Refugees, New York, January 31, 1967, is based on G.A. Res. 2198, 21
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 48, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1966).
4. In his Note on International Protection submitted to the Executive Committee on 4th September, (1975),
1, 2, (U.N. Doc. A/A.C. 96/518 (1975)), the High

Commissioner stated:
The number of de facto refugees is much smaller than was thought...
The existing legal instruments relating to the status of refugees, and in
particular the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol and, hopefully at a

subsequent stage, the draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, constitute an adequate basis for the international protection of refugees, provided that they are fully implemented in a liberal manner.
It seems, however, that in this passage-which presupposes acceptance of the
Draft Convention-the High Commissioner used the term de facto refugees to

connote those who qualify within the mandate but are not recognized by the
authorities of the States in which they live. The context appears to exclude the

alternative meaning of the term, viz: those who do not qualify within the mandate but are fugitives from persecution.
5. The following 60 States are parties to both the Convention and the Protocol: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brazil,
Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, People's Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of
Germany, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guinea,

Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Liech-
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It is not to be presumed that those fugitives from persecution who
do not fall within the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner are in all instances deprived of international protection. The
High Commissioner is frequently authorized by the General Assembly to undertake responsibilities for particular groups of displaced
persons who do not fall within his or her statutory competence. In
addition, there exist many other international organizations, public
and private, with functions complementary to those of the UNHCR,
the largest being the Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration (ICEM). Even so, the exclusion of some fifty per cent of the
world's refugees from the mandate of the international community's
principal functionary charged with refugees' protection is a matter of
some concern. This fact is particularly disturbing because a good
number of the States which are parties to the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol have based parts of their immigration laws precisely
upon those instruments, so that for a displaced person to qualify for
admission to such a country as a refugee, he or she must first qualify
under the international instruments.7 Among the States which have
based parts of their immigration laws on the Convention of 1951 and
Protocol of 1967 are the United Kingdom and, subject to several
reservations, the United States 9 (with consequences which will be
tenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland,
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire,
and Zambia. The following are parties to the Convention only: Colombia,
Jamaica, Kenya, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, Monaco, and Peru. The United
States of America and Swaziland are parties to the Protocol only. The estimated
combined populations of these countries is 1,130,000,000, or 912,000,000 after the
deduction of the populations of the United States and Swaziland. THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, 601-02, 497-588 (G. Delury ed. 1977).

6. This is done in pursuance of the so-called "good offices" resolutions; e.g.:
G.A. Res. 1784, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 34, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
7. The definition of refugee, contained in Article 1 of the Convention of 1951
and in the Protocol of 1967, has been incorporated into the following domestic
laws: Denmark: Act No. 224 of 7th June, 1952, Regarding the Admission of
Foreigners, 2; France: Law No. 52-893 of 25th July, 1952, and Presidential
Decree No. 54-1055 of 14th October, 1954, 1954 D.432; Germany: Asylum Ordinance, 1953 BGBI 3; Norway: Aliens' Act of 27th June, 1956,2; Sweden: Foreigners Law of 30th April, 1954, art. 2.
8. Statement of Immigration Rules for Control on Entry: Commonwealth
Citizens, H.C. 79, § 54 (1973); Statement of Immigration Rules for Control After
Entry: EEC and Other Non-Commonwealth Nationals, H.C. 81, 55 (1973);
Statement of Immigration Rules for Control After Entry: EEC and Other NonCommonwealth Nationals, H.C. 82, % 28 & 57 (1973).
9. Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7) (West
Supp. 1977).

examined subsequently'0 ).
Thus, in an attempt to rectify some of the shortcomings of the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, delegates of ninety-two countries
met at a conference in Geneva in 1977, convened with the object of
considering a proposed new Convention on Territorial Asylum. The
proposed new Convention, and the conference, were concerned more
with increasing the degree of protection afforded to those falling
within the existing definition of a refugee than with broadening the
definition to include more of those fugitives who are currently excluded from the purview of the High Commissioner." Moreover, the
various delegations failed to reach agreement on the basis of the text
before them and deferred further consideration of the proposed new
Convention to an indefinite date.' This Article suggests that better
prospects may exist for agreement at the reconvened conference and
calls for the realization of substantial benefits from the Convention
that may be adopted there if its emphasis were altered to deal more
effectively with fugitives from persecution who presently do not
qualify as refugees.
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CURRENTLY GOVERNING THE
DEFINITION AND ADMISSION OF REFUGEES

The general rule of customary international law that no individual
may assert a right to enter a State of which he or she is not a national
is normally acknowledged to apply to refugees as well as to other
migrants. 13 Thus, the so-called right of asylum-or Droit d'asile-is
10. See text accompanying notes 40-41 infra.
11. The High Commissioner's mandate is based not on the Convention of 1951
and Protocol of 1967 but on the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428,5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 46, U.N.
Doc. A/1775 (1950). The definition of the High Commissioner's competence, in
Article 6 of that Statute, corresponds, but does not precisely coincide, with the
definition of refugees in Article 1 of the Convention of 1951, as modified by the
Protocol of 1967. For the prolongation of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, see G.A. Res. 2957, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 12)
65, U.N. Doc. A/8712 (1972); G.A. Res. 2294,22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 38, U.N.
Doc. A/6717 (1967); G.A. Res. 1783, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 33, U.N. Doe.
A/5217 (1962); G.A. Res. 1039, 12 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 18)18, U.N. Doc. A/3572
and Corrigenda 1, at x (1957); G.A. Res. 727,8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 15, U.N.
Doc. A/2361 (1953).
12. For the materials and proceedings of the Conference, see U.N. Doc.
A/10177 (1975); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 78/DC 2-5 (1977); U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 78/DC/R.1
(1977); U.N. Doc. AIConf. 78/C.1/L.104/Add. 1-7 (1977); U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
78/C.1/SR1-28 (1977); and Corrigenda; U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 78/SR 1-9 (1977) and
Corrigenda.
13. D. O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 695-96, 740 (1970); 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 616 (7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
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usually admitted to appertain not to the refugee but to the State,
which enjoys-subject to any limitations that might be imposed by
conventions-a discretion to grant or withhold asylum.' 4 This principle has been accepted in both domestic 15 and international 6 judicial
proceedings. Nothing in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man1 8 or in European law 9 displaces it, nor does the Geneva Convention or the Protocol do so.
14. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITiS EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

223 (1953); F. Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327, 335
(1949); P. Weis, Legal Aspects of the Convention of 25th July, 1951 Relating to
the Status of Refugees, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 478, 481 (1953). For further references and contrary opinions, see R. PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
LAW, 217-18 (1972).
15. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442 (1886); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d
921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1934). For
further cases, see R. PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 237-39 (1972).
16. The Asylum Case (Columbia v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. 266,282,284,297 (judgement on merits).
17. Article 14(1) declares that "everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution." Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, U.N.Y.B. 535 (1948-49). This represents a change from the original unadopted text which envisaged a right "to seek and be granted.., asylum." U.N.
Doc A/C 3/285 Rev. 1 (1948). See also Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327, 337 (1949).
18. Article 27 proclaims that "every person has the right to seek and receive
asylum" but only "in accordance with the laws of each country and with international agreements." 43 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 133 (1949) (Resolution XXX, Final
Act, 9th International Conference of American States, Bogota, Columbia, Mar.
30-May 9, 1948 (Pan American Union 1948) at 38).
19. Migrant workers in the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), irrespective of any claim they may have to refugee status, enjoy freedom of movement pursuant to Article 48 of the E.E.C. Treaty, if, interalia,they are nationals
of a member State of the E.E.C. working or seeking to work in another such
State. E.E.C. Council Reg. 1612/68, E.E.C. Council Directive 68/360, and E.E.C.
Council Directive 68/359 of 15th October, 1968; E.E.C. Commission Regulation
1251/70 of 29th June, 1970. Less extensive rights of a similar nature are now
accorded to Turkish nationals in pursuance of the Article 12 of the Association
Agreement of 12th September, 1963, and E.E.C./Turkey Council of Association
Decision 2/76 of 20th December, 1976. The only specific mention of refugees in
the E.E.C.'s law governing freedom of movement is in E.E.C. Council Regulation
1408/71 of 14th June, 1971, dealing with social security of migrant workers. This
incorporates in Article 1(d) the definition contained in the 1951 Convention.
See also the Protocol to the European Convention on Consular Functions
concerning the Protection of Refugees, E.T.S. 61, and the European Agreement
on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees, 376 U.N.T.S. 85. The E.E.C. Council was
pressed by the Economic and Social Committee to extend freedom of movement
to refugees residing in any Member State. But the Governments of the Member
States, meeting in Council, merely made a Declaration that they would regard
with particular favor any unilateral measure by a Member State to extend that

Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention of 1951 did not go so
far as to surrender, with respect to each other, their discretionary
power to grant or to withhold asylum to refugees arriving at their
ports. They made more limited concessions. In particular, they
agreed not to expel or return a refugee to the frontiers of a country
where his or her life or freedom would be threatened because of race,
religion, nationality, social group or political opinion.2" In addition,
they conferred upon refugees privileges regarding expulsion to countries other than countries of persecution 2 and privileges regarding
such matters as religion,22 personal status,2 3 property, 4 freedom of
association,2" gainful occupation,2 6 welfare,27 and administrative
measures. 28 In lieu of national passports, they also agreed to issue
travel documents to refugees lawfully within their territories. 29 For
all of these purposes the Contracting Parties were required to define
the term refugee.
The definition is to be found in Article 1 of the Convention of 1951.
The article begins by providing that the term refugee shall embrace
any person who has been considered as such under certain anterior
treaties, including the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization. 30 There follows the crucial paragraph stipulating that the
expression also extends to any person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside his country of nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence
...is unable or, owing to
31
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This form of words follows the language of the Statute of the High
Commissioner's Office, subject to two major differences (and to more
freedom to such refugees. Declaration of 25th March, 1964, J.O. 1964 No. 78 at
1225.
20. Geneva Convention of 1951, art. 33.
21. Id., art. 32.
22. Id., art. 4.
23. Id., art. 12.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
Id.,

arts. 13, 14.
art. 15.
arts. 17-19.
arts. 20-24.
arts. 25-27, 29, 31, 34.

29. Id., art. 23, schedule and annex.
30. The International Refugee Organization, which existed from 1946 to 1952,
dealt with some 630,000 post-war refugees, the majority of whom emigrated to
the United States, Israel, and Australia. See R. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE U.N. (1956); Ristelhueber, The InternationalRefugee Organization,470 INT'L CONCILIATION 167 (1951).
31. Geneva Convention of 1951, art. 1A, 2.
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subtle distinctions to which we shall return). The first major difference is that in order to qualify as a refugee within the Convention, an
asylum-seeker must not only satisfy the criteria in the foregoing
extract, but must, in addition, show that the fear of returning to his
or her own country, or his or her inability to do so, is a result of
events occurring before 1951. Parties to the Protocol of 1967, however, undertake to apply the substance of the 1951 Convention to any
person who comes within the definition of Article 1 of the Convention as if the Convention omitted any qualification respecting the
date of the events resulting in the asylum-seeker's expatriation.
The second major difference between the 1951 Convention and the
designation of the High Commissioner's competence in the foregoing
extract from his Statute lies in a provision for the territorial limitation of the former. On signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention, each party must make a declaration of the territorial application of the Convention so far as that party is concerned. In particular
the party may declare that it will be bound to apply the Convention
with regard only to asylum-seekers expatriated as a result of events
occurring in Europe before the beginning of 1951.32
All but seven of the parties to the 1951 Convention, with a combined population of some 48,000,000, have ratified the Protocol, thus
dispensing with the limitation of time. However, nine States, with a
combined population of about 252,500,000, have made declarations
limiting the application of the Convention to those who have fled
from their homelands as a result of events occurring in Europe.
The definition of the word refugee in the Convention and Protocol,
and the designation of the High Commissioner's competence in the
Statute, are modified by rules governing the circumstances in which
an individual may forfeit the protection of both instruments. Fugitives lose that protection (1) if they avail themselves voluntarily of
the protection of their country of nationality; or (2) if, having lost
their nationality, they voluntarily reacquire it; or (3) if, having acquired a new nationality, they enjoy the protection of the country of
that nationality; or (4) if they re-establish themselves voluntarily in
the country which they left or outside which they remained owing to
fear of persecution; or (5) if they are able to return to their country of
32. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).

nationality or
former habitual residence following a change of cir33
cumstances.

SOME DEFECTS IN THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITION OF REFUGEE

It is in the more subtle differences between the language of the
Convention and that of the Statute that one discerns the hallmark of
compromise: ambiguity.34 The Statute embraces not only those who
are outside their countries of nationality or former habitual residence owing to fear of persecution there, but also embraces those
who are outside those countries "for reasons other than personal
convenience." This vague phrase-which might or might not cover
persons such as draft evaders or those who emigrate to avoid racial
prejudice-was omitted from the Convention. Instead, the Convention introduced an expression of comparable imprecision. Whereas
the Statute refers only to persecution for reasons of "race, religion,
nationality or political opinion," the Convention adds to this catalogue a fifth category: "membership of a particular social group."
The addition was intended to ensure that the Convention would
embrace those-particularly in Eastern Europe during the Cold
War-who were persecuted because of their social origins. The language in the Convention is, however, more expansive than would
have been necessary to achieve that objective; and although the
leading textbooks tell us that the phrase has to be construed generously,3" they give little, if any, guidance as to the perimeters of the
expression. The difficulty is not imaginary. It is not uncommon for
fugitives belonging to groups other than those listed in the Statute to
claim the status of refugees.36 In such cases, the court or tribunal may
be obliged to determine whether the group in question is or is not a
social group. The tribunal may be tempted to conclude that members
33. Geneva Convention of 1951, art. IC; Statute of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR, art. 6A
(proviso), Supp. (No. 20) 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
34. For alternative definitions of the word refugee see ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
AND BACKGROUND MATERIALS 23-32 (1966).
35. M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 151
(1956); 1 A. GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219
(1966); S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (1971); J. VERNANT, THE
REFUGEE IN THE POST-WAR WORLD 7 (1953); P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-16 (1956). The expression receives no comment in
R. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 93, 158 (1956) or L. KozIEBRODZKI, LE DROIT D'ASILE 161 (1962).

36. For example, in two distinct legal proceedings in England in 1976, claims
to asylum were made by individuals asserting that as homosexuals they were
members of a social group persecuted in their countries of origin. TH/14720/75;
TH/10736/75. Identification withheld. Researchers refer to clerk to the Chief
Adjudicator, Thanet House, Strand, London.
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of any sector of society constitute a social group, and that those who
37
are persecuted in any society ipso facto constitute a sector of it.
Such a conclusion appears to ascribe to the Convention's definition
of a refugee much the same meaning as that definition would have if
"for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion" were omitted. In this respect the
imprecision with which the Convention defines the word refugee has,
at least potentially, the merit of broadening its significance.
The definition in the Convention contains, however, a number of
expressions that have been interpreted as restricting the ambit of the
word refugee in a manner that has occasionally become contentious.
Asylum-seekers, in order to qualify, must show that they have reason
to fear nothing less than persecution, and that this persecution is
such as to make them unwilling to avail themselves of the protection
of their country of nationality (or, if they are stateless, the country of
their former habitual residence). From this definition it is often
inferred that the persecution from which asylum-seekers have fled
must be liable to occur throughout that country, not just in the part
from which they have fled. In addition, it is sometimes maintained
that asylum-seekers qualify only if their persecution is engendered
by their condition (race, religion, nationality, and so on) rather than
by activities in which they have engaged by reason of that condition.
The word persecution is generally taken to exclude individuals
who face discrimination or maltreatment other than of a very serious
kind. For instance, in the United Kingdom 38 the Chief Adjudicator
found that the principal appellant, a member of a racial minority in
his country of origin, might in the event of his return home have to
face prosecution for currency offences entailing "a more severe sentence than any that would be meted out to a member of the [racial
majority]". The Chief Adjudicator continued: "[T]hat racial discrimination against minority groups in [the country] occurs is notorious
knowledge but whether such discrimination is practised by the
[local] courts is not at all clear. If it were, however, it could hardly be
termed persecution." The distinction drawn by the Chief Adjudicator
37. See Ansbach Court in Case 2531 II/56, 15th January, 1957; Case 3008 11/57,
25th November, 1957; Case 11/57, 15th October, 1957. Identification withheld.

Researchers refer to Federal Office for Recognition of Foreign Refugees, Zirndorf, Federal Republic of Germany.
38. TH/12950/75. Identification withheld. Researchers refer to Clerk to the
Chief Adjudicator, Thanet House, Strand, London W.C. 2.

between persecution and prosectuion is by no means novel. Indeed, in
one case the (British) Immigration Appeals Tribunal went so far as to
add that prosecution for breach of a country's laws cannot amount to
persecution.39 This comment is even more remarkable because the
laws in question were of a political character, in as much as they
imposed penalities for degrading or scoffing at the State, its system
or its public organs, for extolling Fascism, and for disseminating
false information injurious to the State. Although it is not suggested that persecution and prosecution are coterminous, it is suggested
that they are by no means mutually exclusive; and it is noteworthy
that the distinction made by the adjudicator and Tribunal in the
United Kingdom has gained little credence in the United States,
where the courts have
had occasion more than once to construe the
4
word persecution. 1

Even if it were more widely accepted that the distinction between
persecution and prosecution is apt to mislead, and if one were to
accept as proper that the appellation refugee is withheld from those
who have reason to fear discrimination or other maltreatment short
of persecution, one might still be justified in expressing surprise at
the fact that the Convention and Protocol, and thus several domestic
laws, designate as refugees only those who have fled from persecution and exclude fugitives from natural disasters 41 and from civil and
international war. This limitation on the definition of refugee owes
its origin to the fact that the refugee is designated as a person who
stands in need of international protection because he or she is deprived of that in his or her own country. Such reasoning and definition may well be appropriate for the purpose of determining whether
an individual should receive an international travel document and
should be eligible for the diplomatic protection afforded by the High
Commissioner's representatives; however, it appears inappropriate
for the purpose of determining whether an applicant qualifies for
4
admission to a country of asylum and to freedom from refoulment. 1
The compassionate claim of a fugitive from persecution may, after
39. TH/5911/75. Identification withheld. Researchers refer to Clerk to the
Tribunal Immigration Appeals, Thanet House, Strand, London W.C. 2.
40. In Cheng Fu Sheng v. Barber, 269 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1959), the court
interpreted the phrase "in fear of persecution" as it appeared in the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953 and concluded that the test was essentially a subjective one. In

Shubash v. INS, 450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971), the appellate court found no
evidence of persecution. See also Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970);
Leong Leun Do v. Esperdy, 197 F. Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 309 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1962).
41. But see Immigration & Nationality Act § 203(a)(7), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(7)

(West Supp. 1977).
42. See Geneva Convention of 1951, art. 33.

[VOL. 15:

45, 1977)

TerritorialAsylum
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

all, be no greater than that of a person displaced by an earthquake4 3
or a civil war."

The requirement that refugees should be unwilling or unable to
avail themselves of the protection of their own countries may likewise prove more appropriate to the question of documentation and
protection than to that of resettlement. Persons displaced by the
changes of government in Angola and Mozambique, eligible to claim
or maintain Portuguese nationality, do not qualify as refugees if
willing to seek Portuguese protection. In the event of their emigration to Portugal, they are designated as returnees, though they may
never have been in Portugal and may not be of Portuguese descent.
Fugitives from Rhodesia are seldom eligible to benefit from the Convention and Protocol because in most cases they are nationals of the
United Kingdom, willing and able to avail themselves of British
protection, although ineligible for admission to the United Kingdom
under current immigration law.4 5
The Convention and Protocol do not expressly state that a fugitive,

in order to qualify, must have reason to fear persecution throughout
his or her country of origin, but the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner has on occasion, given this interpretation to it. Thus,
Greeks or Turkish Cypriots fail to qualify, though they show that in
the event of their returning to their villages they risk persecution by
compatriots of'different ethnic extraction. The same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to Christians or Moslems from the Lebanon.
43. As this Article goes to press, fugitives from earthquakes in the Comoros
and Oman had received emergency relief from outside their countries of origin.
It is understood that many such fugitives were unwilling to return to their
homelands, and it is unlikely that in the event of their so doing they would be
able to reestablish themselves successfully.
44. Recent examples of disorders which have displaced persons failing to
qualify as refugees include those in the Lebanon and in Vietnam prior to the fall
of Saigon.
45. The authorities actually in power in Rhodesia are of the view that those
whose national status depended upon their connections with the colony of
Southern Rhodesia ceased to be nationals of the United Kingdom upon the
Unilateral Declaration of Independence on November 11, 1965. The same authorities have adopted a Citizenship of Rhodesia Act (1970). Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is of the view that there remains in force in
relation to Rhodesia the Citizenship of Southern Rhodesia and British Nationality Act of 1949 (as amended by the Citizenship of Southern Rhodesia and British
Nationality Act of 1963) and that an individual who is a citizen of Southern
Rhodesia by virtue of the Act of 1949 (as amended) is a national of the United
Kingdom. Not all such nationals are free to enter the United Kingdom without
let or hindrance, for the "right of abode" is enjoyed only by those who qualify as
"patrials" of the United Kingdom by virtue of their associations with the Kingdom itself, rather than associations with a colony. Immigration Act of 1971, § 2.

In distinguishing between persecution for religious or political
opinion and persecution for activities undertaken in consequence of
these opinions, a tribunal is apt to reflect a moral dilemma in a
terminological one. Fugitives whose religious convictions have induced them to refuse to engage in military service, 46 or whose political convictions have induced them to attempt regicide,47 may be met
with the argument that the punishment that they can anticipate in
their country of origin, even if so condign as to constitute persecution, is not persecution for reason of religious or political opinion but
rather for reason of activities undertaken contrary to the law of the
land. The distinction, although superficially attractive, has the consequence of excluding from the definition of refugee many groups for
whose benefit the Convention and Protocol appear designed. It is
seldom the mere possession of an opinion that attracts persecution;
rather it is its expression. It can scarcely be argued that the Convention and Protocol fail to extend to a person persecuted for worshipping according to Jewish rites, for the principle relied upon holds
that it is one thing to adhere to a faith and another to manifest it. It
seems that at present, the correct test is to determine whether the
punishment that the fugitive can expect in consequence of his crime
is any greater than that which would be meted out to an individual of
different political or religious opinion who has committed a similar
offence in the same country and at the same time. The Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, if adopted in its present form, would
substitute that test with one encompassing a wider category of fugitives from prosecution.
THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON TERRITORIAL ASYLUM

The Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum is written with the
object, among others, of disposing several of the foregoing limitations on the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. It begins, and has
hitherto attracted the most widespread attention, with an article
designed to qualify the right of.Contracting Parties to grant or with46. For example, see TH11239175 (appeal pending). Identification withheld.
Researchers refer to Clerk to the Tribunal, Immigration Appeals, Thanet
House, Strand, London W.C. 2.
47. Lt. Col. Amerikrane of the Moroccan Air Force arrived in Gibraltar
immediately after an unsuccessful attempt had been made on the life of the
King of Morocco. He asked for political asylum but was returned to Morocco on
the next day at the request of the Moroccan authorities and was there executed.
His widow introduced an application to the European Commission on Human
Rights, alleging various infringements of the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The case was concluded by friendly settlement: the Government of the United Kingdom agreeing to pay the applicant an
ex gratia sum of £ 37,500 (about $65,000.00). 1 COUNCIL OF EUROPE PRESS COMMUNIQUE C 29 (1974); F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 32

(1975).
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hold asylum at their discretion. The article is couched in tentative
language: "[E]ach Contracting State, acting in the exercise of its
sovereignty, shall endeavor in a humanitarian spirit to grant asylum
in its territory to any person eligible for the benefits of this Convention." At the Conference in Geneva in 1977 delegates voted to effect a
slight change of wording in that sentence and to add a new paragraph stating that asylum should not be refused on the ground only
that it could be sought in another State. The new paragraph was,
however, qualified by a proviso stating that the fugitive may be
required first to seek asylum in another State with which he or she
has connections, if it appears fair to do so. The reference to
sovereignty is reinforced by Article 9 of the Draft: "Qualification of
the grounds for granting asylum or applying the provisions of this
Convention appertains to the Contracting State whose territory the
person concerned has entered or seeks to enter and seeks asylym."
This, in turn, contains an echo of the Declaration on Territorial
Asylum,4 8 but it is more conservative than the latter because it preserves the discretionary power of the State not only in the case of the
grant of asylum but also in the cases of refoulment, provisional stay,
international cooperation, voluntary repatriation, and cooperation
with the United Nations to the extent that these are regulated by the
Draft Convention. Draft Article 9, moreover, speaks not of evaluation but of qualification of the right, which seems to preserve for
each Contracting Party a right to qualify or limit the application of
the Draft Convention as a whole.4 9
Article 2(1) of the Draft Convention sets out the circumstances in
which a person is eligible for the benefits of the instrument. It is to be
noted that in revising the Draft, the Group of Experts substituted the
word eligible in this context for the word entitled. Subject to two
exceptions, and to an immaterial change of syntax, Draft Article 2(1)
corresponds with the definition of refugee in the Convention of 1951,
as modified by the Protocol of 1967.
The first exception is that in the Draft there is to be inserted after
the words "persecution for reasons of . ..political opinion" the
phrase "including the struggle against colonialization and apart48. G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968),
art. 1(3): "It shall rest with the State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds

for the grant of asylum."
49. It now seems to be acknowledged that the wording of Article 9 is at fault.
See 30 U.N. GAOR 93, U.N. Doc. A/10177 (1975) ( 125).

heid." The second is that under the Draft Convention a fugitive is to
be eligible if he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her
country owing to a well-founded fear of "persecution, prosecution or
punishment for acts directly related to the persecution as set forth"
in the preceding subparagraph. The Draft thus envisages that a
fugitive will qualify as a refugee if he or she has fled to escape
prosecution for an act undertaken in pursuance of a political opinion,
including opposition to colonialism and apartheid. The language in
which the article is expressed is more generous than would be required in order to protect freedom fighters and guerillas. Thus, one
who for purely mercenary reasons assists a refugee to flee from his or
her country of origin qualifies under the Draft provision if he or she
risks punishment for some breach of the emigration law of the refugee's own country. The same presumably applies to a mercenary
who, under instructions from politically motivated employers, commits a common offence, unless that offence falls within Article 2(2) of
the Draft.5 0
Under Article 2(2), the provisions of the preceding paragraph are
not to apply to anyone suspected of committing a crime against
peace, a war crime, a crime against humanity as defined in relevant
international instruments, a serious common offence5" under the
laws and regulations of the Contracting State granting asylum, or
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. In
this context the expression "serious common offence under the laws
• . .of the.

.

.State granting asylum" denotes an act triable as an

offence in the country of asylum and not an act which would be so
triable if done there or a genus of serious offence known to the laws
of the country of asylum.
Under Article 3, Contracting States would agree not to return an
individual entitled to the benefits of the Draft Convention to a country where he or she would be persecuted. 2 It is noteworthy that in
this Draft Article alone there appears the word entitled. Presumably
the words entitled to will now be altered to read eligiblefor, for it is
improbable that the Draft Convention will be reamended so as to
confer any entitlement. In its original form, the second part of Article
3 dealt with the fugitive who presents himself or herself at the
frontier of a Contracting State, but may still be within the territory
50. An amendment excluding mercenaries was tabled at the Conference and
did not receive further consideration.
51. Cf. Geneva Convention of 1951, art. 1 F(b), which speaks of a "serious
nonpolitical offence."
52. The text of the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum reads: "persecution, prosecution or punishment for any of the reasons cited in Article 1." This
seems to be an error. The reference is to Article 2.
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of his or her own State and hence is unable to qualify as a refugee."3
In such cases the original form of the Draft Convention envisaged,
with a qualified hesitancy characteristic of the whole instrument,
that a Contracting State would "use its best endeavours" to ensure
that the fugitive is not rejected at the frontier "if there are wellfounded reasons for believing that such rejection would subject him
to persecution, prosecution or punishment" for the reasons stated
previously. The discrepancy as regards refoulment between persons
in the country and those at the borders was, however, removed when
the second part of the Draft Article was revised by the Committee of
the Whole.
Under Article 4 of the Draft Convention, individuals seeking asylum are to be granted provisional admission pending the determination of their requests. The article is silent on the question of distinguishing between applicants genuinely seeking asylum and applicants abusing the process for the purpose of gaining temporary admission.
There are four additional articles with which we need not now be
concerned, as they bear only indirectly upon national laws governing
the admission of refugees. At their meeting in the spring of 1975, the
Group of Experts recommended adding to these four articles a new
article to specify that Contracting States may grant asylum to people
eligible for the benefits of the proposed Convention on terms more
favorable than those set out therein, or might grant asylum to people
other than those set out therein, it being understood that in the latter
case the provisions of the proposed Convention should not apply. The
additional Draft Article is designed only to clarify, and not to alter,
the effect of the preceding ones. Indeed, in the case of the Convention
of 1951 it was assumed, in the absence of any such article as the
Group has composed, that Contracting States remain free to grant to
people not qualifying as refugees within its definition the treatment
for which it provides. It was in view of this assumption that the
United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons adopted Recommendation E, expressing the hope that the 1951 Convention would have value as an
example exceeding its contractual scope.
At its twenty-first meeting, on 31st January, 1977, the Committee
of the Whole proposed the incorporation within the Draft Conven53. The requirement that the refugee should be outside his country of origin,

expressed in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention of 1951, is implied in Article 2
of the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum.

tion of a new article on family reunion. This would impose on Contracting States the duty of facilitating the admission to their territories of spouses and minor children of people to whom they have
granted the benefits of the Convention. The proposed new article
would not oblige Contracting States absolutely to admit such spouses
or children. It does not deal with the problems of public, and particularly private, international law that are likely to arise in interpreting
the words spouse and minor.
CONCLUSIONS

The definition of a refugee contained in the 1951 Convention,
modified by the 1967 Protocol, and reconsidered in the Draft Convention on Territorial Asylum, has significance not only for international agencies and relations but also for the drafting and interpretation of domestic immigration laws. In the United Kingdom, the immigration rules not only quote and purport to be in accord with the
definition contained in the Convention, 54 but must be interpreted in
light of that international instrument. 5 In the United States, which
occupies the rare but not unique position of being a party to the 1967
Protocol but not to the 1951 Convention, 6 the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 adopts in part the language of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, of which the United
States was a member and from which the definition contained in the
1951 Convention was derived. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 uses
language originating from the same source. It is apparent, then,
that deficiencies in the language of the international instruments,
resulting from compromise, may be transmitted to domestic immigration law and policy. The conclusion of an international agreement
having the effect of modifying the Conventional definition of a refugee is thus a matter of domestic as well as international interest. It
may be of particular interest in the United States if it leads to a
reconsideration of United States policy respecting adhesion to the
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol.
At the Geneva Conference in 1977 there appears to have been
widespread acceptance of the humanitarian argument in favor of
54. See authority cited note 8 supra.Footnotes to the cited immigration rules
read: "The criterion for the grant of asylum is in accordance with Article 1 of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees."
55. For the interpretation of immigration rules in the light of international
conventions, see Birdi v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, The Times L.R.,
12th February, 1975; R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Phansopkar [1975] 3 ALL E.R. 497 (Ch.); R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex
parte Akhtar [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1717 (C.A.).
56. See note 5 supra.
57. 3 C.J.S. Aliens § 92 (1973).
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extending the definition of refugee-although not on the perimeters
of the new definition. This being so, the failure of that conference to
reach agreement constitutes no objection to a renewed effort to redefine the term. There would be something to be gained, and little lost,
by extending the Conventional definition, in the pattern of the Walter-McCarran Act, to include refugees from natural disasters. It is
appreciated that the view is widely held that fugitives from natural
disasters, although standing in need of the assistance of the United
Nations High Commissioner, are not in need of his protection, as they
continue to enjoy the diplomatic protection of the Governments of
their own countries. To raise this observation as an objection to
including refugees from natural disasters within the Conventional
definition of refugee is, however, to misinterpret the object of the
amendment. The amendment here proposed would extend to such
fugitives, in the territories of Contracting Parties, the right to benefit
from the provisions in the 1951 Convention governing civil rights and
obligations, juridical status, employment, welfare, and administrative measures, save that parties to the new Convention would probably wish to reserve Convention Travel Documents for refugees from
persecution alone. The move might also be expected to have the
result of assuring the preferential treatment of refugees from natural
disasters in the event of their seeking admission to the territories of
States basing their immigration laws upon their international undertakings.
There would also be merit in a proposal to extend the definition of
refugee to cover fugitives from civil war, unable or unwilling by
reason of the hostilities, or consequences of hostilities, to return to
their countries of origin. Refugees in this category might also be
considered ineligible to receive Convention Travel Documents; but
this need in no way diminish their claim to preferential admission
and to the benefits of the provisions governing the treatment of
refugees within the territories of Contracting Parties.
Finally, there is much to be said in favor'of the subparagraph,
contained in the Draft Convention, which would extend protection to
fugitives from prosecution or punishment for acts directly related to
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership
of a particular social group or political opinion. It is a measure
which, in the case of Contracting Parties, would achieve the disposition of the misleading distinction between persecution for an opinion
and persecution for its expression, and would discard the proposition

that prosecution and persecution are mutually exclusive. To meet
this purpose, however, and to command acceptance, the subparagraph
requires two alterations: one of drafting and one of greater substance. The former is a change of wording so as to limit protection
only to activities motivated by political or religious opinion, race,
nationality or membership of a social group and not to encompass all
activities directly related to those qualities. The latter is a designation of the activities which would attract the protection of the Convention. It is a moral issue which needs to be faced squarely by the
Contracting Parties, for if this is not done the Draft Convention can
aspire to do no more than to conceal the strong differences between
them.

